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Abstract
A large share of students in higher education graduates with delay or fails to obtain a
degree at all. In our field experiment, students can sign a non-binding agreement and
self-commit to staying on track for graduation. We provide first evidence that soft com-
mitment devices can enhance educational progress and – more generally – improve the
completion of complex tasks such as passing exams. A pure reminder treatment does
not change behavior, suggesting that the effects are not driven by increased salience. As
predicted by a simple decision model, we show that procrastinators benefit most from
the soft commitment device.
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1 Introduction
A large share of students in higher education never obtains a degree, and those who do gra-
duate often take much longer than scheduled. In the U.S., less than 40% of a cohort entering
four-year institutions obtain a bachelor’s degree within four years; within six years, slightly
less than 60% have graduated and that number does not increase by much with more time.1
In Germany, one in four students fail to obtain a tertiary degree (OECD 2013), and only 40%
of the students who obtain a tertiary degree do so within the prescribed time.2 The U.S. and
Germany are no exceptions. In many countries delayed graduation is prevalent, and about
30% of students entering a four-year tertiary education in the OECD do not complete their
studies (OECD 2013).
Both late graduation and non-completion imply a waste of resources (for students as well
as for universities) and a loss or delay of the social and individual returns from higher edu-
cation. At the level of the society, the formation of human capital is central for the economic
well-being and growth of countries.3 At the individual level, there is ample evidence that
higher education not only generates monetary gains, but also a number of non-pecuniary
benefits, such as greater civic participation, life and job satisfaction, and better health.4 Ac-
cordingly, for most students, exceedingly long times to completion or dropping out of uni-
versity are undesirable outcomes.
The recent literature emphasizes several reasons why students can make non-optimal
education decisions.5 First, students may lack the necessary information to effectively orga-
nize their studies. This can mean being unaware of what classes to take in which sequence,
or a lack of knowledge about how many exams per semester are needed in order to be on
track for graduation. Problems of this nature can be approached in a rather straightforward
way, by providing students with the necessary information. Second, limited attention can
hamper the academic progress of students. This means that even if students have received
the information on how to best proceed in their studies, the information may become less
salient over time. Third, problems of self-regulation can interfere with academic success.
1See the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), Jan 19 2017, retrieved from
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/ d13/tables/dt13_326.10.asp. The National Student Clearinghouse
reports an eight year completion rate of 65.2% for the 2006 cohort, with another 6.6% still enrolled (own
calculations from Shapiro, Dundar, Yuan, Harrell and Wakhungu 2014).
2See DESTATIS, Jan 19 2017, retrieved from https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/
Pressemitteilungen/2014/02/PD14_037_213.html.
3For summaries on growth theory, see, for example, Barro and Sala-i Martin (2003) and Acemoglu (2009).
For a recent survey of the related empirical literature, see Hanushek and Wößmann (2010).
4See the surveys of Psacharopoulos (1987), Psacharopoulos (1994), and Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011).
5For an overview, see the surveys on the behavioral economics of education in Koch, Nafziger and Nielsen
(2015), Lavecchia, Liu and Oreopoulos (2014), and Leaver (2016).
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The story is familiar: At the beginning of the semester students aspire to excel academically.
However, as the exam period draws nearer, the cost of studying becomes more tangible and
students refrain from following through on their original intentions. Procrastination is con-
sidered a “quintessential self-regulatory failure” (Steel 2007), and when directly asked, a large
share of students thinks of themselves as procrastinators (Potts 1987). In fact, procrastina-
tion is estimated to affect up to 95% of tertiary students (Ellis and Knaus 1979). There is
reason to believe that procrastination can lead to poor academic performance (Semb, Glick
and Spencer 1979) – which may be one of the reasons why more than 60% of students state
that they want to reduce their procrastination (Solomon and Rothblum 1984).
In this paper, we focus on whether the latter two reasons for non-optimal education deci-
sions can be overcome by offering students a reminder scheme and a commitment device.6
We first provide a simple theoretical model and then report results from a field experiment.
In our model, students face a two dimensional intertemporal decision problem. They
choose (i) how much study effort they want to invest and (ii) whether or not to take an exam.
Because students have to study before they take an exam, their intertemporal preferences
play a central role for their decisions. Provided that studying and taking an exam is econo-
mically optimal, we show that a student is motivated to study and take an exam if she has
time-consistent preferences or if she has time-inconsistent preferences and her present bias
is sufficiently low. Otherwise the student procrastinates. We model a situation where indi-
viduals can make a non-binding commitment to take the exam. Unlike hard commitments,
such soft commitments do not entail monetary, physical or otherwise tangible consequen-
ces.7 Rather, they create a reference point, and failure to reach the reference point will entail
psychological costs.8 As a consequence, the commitment device is predicted to increase the
number of exams taken and passed. In the absence of commitment, a pure reminder scheme
could also potentially improve performance if students pay little attention to tasks related to
the exams.
The subjects in the corresponding field experiment are the incoming cohort of business
administration majors at a German university. All students receive an introductory lecture
on how to best organize their studies in order to stay on track for a timely graduation. The
lecture initially establishes the same academic goals for all students, by providing specific
information on the suggested curriculum (how many and which specific exams to take), and
by stressing the importance of starting to prepare for the exams in time. Since this infor-
6Bryan, Karlan and Nelson 2010, p.672, define a commitment device as “an arrangement entered into by an
individual with the aim of helping fulfill a plan for future behavior that would otherwise be difficult owing to
intrapersonal conflict stemming from, for example, a lack of self-control.”
7See Bryan, Karlan and Nelson (2010) for a discussion of hard versus soft commitments.
8See Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1991), and Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
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mation is provided at the beginning of the semester, it may fail to remain salient over time.
In order to address this problem, we send the first treatment group two reminder letters via
mail.9 The first letter is sent out in the week before the exam sign-ups take place. It reminds
students that it is recommended to sign up for all exams that the official curriculum pres-
cribes. We mail a second reminder letter six weeks before the actual exam period, urging
students to start studying and to take the suggested exams.
Whenever limited attention and low salience is the cause for failing to participate in
or pass exams, a pure reminder should be sufficient to alleviate the problem. However, if
students tend to procrastinate, then another technology is needed. In our second – and
main – treatment group, we therefore offer students the opportunity to sign a non-binding
agreement, on top of sending them reminders. In this agreement, students can declare that
they will adhere to the exam schedule recommended by the university, and take the sug-
gested exams. We make clear that signing this soft commitment and then not complying
with the schedule does not carry any consequences, aside from forgoing the credit for pas-
sed exams. As shown in the theoretical model, the effectiveness of the agreement relies on it
establishing a reference point, which students then seek to achieve. In contrast to hard com-
mitments, soft commitments are always self-enforcing, i.e. there is no need for an external
party (e.g. the university) to enforce the commitment. The reason is that students make an
effort to avoid the negative psychological costs associated with falling short of the reference
point.
We show that the pure reminder treatment has no effect on exam sign-up, participation
and the number of exams passed. This suggests that limited attention is not a problem when
students study for, sign up for, or take exams. In contrast, the soft commitment device is
highly effective. It motivates students to take part in 11% more exams, and pass 13% more
exams than the controls (an improvement of roughly a quarter standard deviation), while
maintaining the same grade point average as the control group. Interestingly, the effect is
largest in the two mathematically challenging exams. This could indicate that students tend
to procrastinate more when exams are more difficult, i.e., with more complex tasks.
We also document that – in line with the theoretical model – the soft commitment de-
vice changes the behavior of procrastinators, whereas it does not affect the outcomes of
non-procrastinators. We use administrative data to identify as procrastinators those stu-
dents who applied late in the application period for the business administration program.
While not all late appliers are procrastinators, the reverse is very plausible: students who are
procrastinators will apply late; for similar approaches, see Reuben, Sapienza and Zingales
9For examples of reminder schemes in different contexts, see Altmann and Traxler (2014) and Karlan, Berry
and Pradhan (2015).
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(2015), De Paola and Scoppa (2015), Brown and Previtero (2014). Our findings suggest that
procrastinators initially pass fewer exams than the non-procrastinators, and that the soft
commitment device can in fact fully offset this performance deficit.
It is worth mentioning that our soft commitment device is not only effective, but also
inexpensive both in absolute terms as well as in comparison to more traditional measures
of improving educational outcomes, e.g. hiring new faculty in order to reduce class size, or
grant schemes.10 The total cost of our measure per semester and student is under e6 (see
Figure 4).
Relation to the literature. A growing literature in economics explores how commitment de-
vices can help individuals change their behavior and overcome problems of self-control and
procrastination.11 A number of outcomes have been the subject of investigation, and the
effects can be large. For example, Kaur, Kremer and Mullainathan (2015) find that data en-
try workers who choose commitment in the form of an agreement that penalizes low output
increase their performance by 6 percent – an effect which corresponds to that of increasing
wages by 18 percent. Another prominent use of commitment devices is in the context of
savings accounts. Kast, Meier and Pomeranz (2012) offer their subjects to join a self-help
group in order to boost savings – the effects are large, increasing deposits more than three-
fold. Massive increases in employee savings are also found by Thaler and Benartzi (2004)
for a program where individuals can pre-commit a portion of their income to retirement sa-
vings and by Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006), where subjects can open an account that restricts
access to the accrued savings. Commitment devices have also been successfully employed in
health related settings.12 Royer, Stehr and Sydnor (2015) show that long-run gym attendance
can be increased by offering a commitment agreement which allows subjects to pledge mo-
ney towards attending the gym. Milkman, Minson and Volpp (2013) find similar effects of
commitment on gym attendance, though they are not as persistent. Effects of commitment
on smoking cessation are reported by Giné, Karlan and Zinman (2010). They find a 35%
increase in the likelihood of passing a test that one is nicotine free 12 months after the inter-
vention.
We contribute to this research on the effects of commitment devices, and in particular to
the still scant literature concerned with soft commitments. At the same time, our field ex-
10For example the US Pell Grant initiative explicitly aims at rewarding “accelera-
ted completion” and paying an “On-Track Pell Bonus“; see US Department of Edu-
cation, Jan 19 2017, retrieved from http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/
fact-sheet-helping-more-americans-complete-college-new-proposals-success.
11Brocas, Carrillo and Dewatripont (2004) provides an overview from an economics perspective, and Bryan,
Karlan and Nelson (2010) surveys a rich set of applications.
12See Rogers, Milkman and Volpp (2014) for a brief survey.
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periment complements the literature which explores how educational outcomes can be im-
proved. We provide first evidence from a randomized controlled trial that soft commitments
can be highly effective in the education sector. There is some prior research concerned with
commitment in the education domain, but it is not as extensive as one might expect, given
the importance of education and human capital for individuals and societies, as well as at
the high prevalence of procrastination among students. Some studies have focused on de-
adlines as commitment devices, with mixed results. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) find that
students choose early deadlines to turn in their exam paper. This is true even though there is
a grade penalty for failing to meet the deadline, thus constituting a hard commitment. Howe-
ver, the students with self-imposed deadlines fare worse than when deadlines are externally
imposed and evenly spaced.13 Burger, Charness and Lynham (2011) study an experimental
setup where reaching a target number of hours spent studying leads to a monetary payment
to the student, and report that exogenously fixed deadlines do not increase the likelihood of
accumulating the pre-specified number of study hours. Two recent education-focused pa-
pers use commitment devices other than deadlines. Karlan and Linden (2014) investigate
the effects of commitment on savings in Ugandan primary schools. Their commitment de-
vice therefore does not directly target behavior in the education system – rather the subjects
are offered a hard and a soft commitment savings account, where the deposits are designa-
ted to be used for education spending. They find that savings deposits are larger for the soft
commitment. When the commitment device is combined with an information program for
parents, the students’ exam scores increase by .11 standard deviations. This constitutes a
rather large indirect effect on the education outcome, and the authors provide evidence that
it is mediated by increased spending on school supplies. Interestingly, neither the hard nor
the soft commitment version of the account deliver effects on exam scores in the absence of
the parent information component. The second study comes from Patterson (2015), where
the subjects are students in an open online education program. As a means to stay focused
on studying online, students are offered the opportunity to install a software by which they
can pre-commit to a maximum daily amount of time spent on distracting websites. After
exceeding the limit, these websites are blocked. The lockout from certain online activities
constitutes a hard commitment device and is shown to have positive effects on course com-
pletion and grades.
Our research also adds to the strand of literature which identifies procrastination tenden-
cies from observed behavior. Procrastination measures based on real choices – such as the
13The experiment did not evaluate whether self-imposed deadlines lead to a performance boost in compa-
rison to an external deadline that requires to turn in the work on the last day of class, as is the default in most
university settings. The authors do find positive effects of commitment on task completion (vs control) in a
related experiment, but this is for a paid proofreading task.
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college application date – have an advantage over survey responses in that they do not suffer
from systematic measurement error, or bias introduced by respondents answering in soci-
ally desirable ways. Moreover, college applications are decisions with relatively high stakes,
compared to decisions individuals make in lab experiments on procrastination. Another
worthwhile feature is that data on the timing of decisions is often available in administra-
tive data, and therefore the robustness of the measure can be assessed by comparing results
across studies (Brown and Previtero 2014). In fact, our approach towards identifying pro-
crastinators is similar in spirit to a number of recent papers. Reuben, Sapienza and Zingales
(2015) also use the date of application to an MBA program as a measure of procrastination.
De Paola and Scoppa (2015) use the time taken by college applicants for enrolling after they
receive the acceptance letter from university as an indicator of procrastination. They use
this measure to show that a remedial program works better for those facing procrastination
issues. Brown and Previtero (2014) define procrastinators as persons who wait until the last
day of the enrollment period to decide on a health care plan. They show that procrastinators
behave differently in financial decisions than non-procrastinators.
Finally, the paper is related to the “goals” literature in economics and psychology. Locke
and Latham (2002, 2006), as well as Moskowitz and Grant (2009) provide encompassing sur-
veys of the psychological literature, and Corgnet, Gómez-Miñambres and Hernán-Gonzalez
(2015), Gómez-Miñambres (2012), Goerg and Kube (2012), or Koch and Nafziger (2011) ex-
amine the effects of goals on performance from an economics perspective. Contrary to this
literature, we do not focus on the effects of differentially designed goals on behavior. Quite
the opposite, we externally set the same goal for all students. Our results therefore shed light
on the determinants of attaining predefined goals. Specifically, the fact that students in our
commitment group pass more exams than the controls suggests that soft commitment devi-
ces can lead to a higher probability of reaching externally assigned goals.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we develop a theoreti-
cal framework and derive insights about the effects that a commitment device can have on
student behavior. Section 3 outlines the experimental design, describes the randomization
procedure and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 contains the main results. In Section
5, we identify potential procrastinators and show that the effects are driven by these indivi-
duals. Section 6 provides evidence that the treatments do not have negative side effects, and
Section 7 concludes.
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2 A simple model
Consider a set of students {1, ...,n}, each facing a two dimensional intertemporal decision
problem. Student i ∈ {1, ...,n} first has to decide how much study effort ei ∈ {0,1} she wants
to invest, where ei = 1 means that she studies, while ei = 0 means that she does not study.14
Her costs of studying areχi (ei ). We normalizeχi (0)= 0 and writeχi (1)= ci , where ci > 0. The
student’s second choice is whether to take the exam, wi = 1, or not take the exam, wi = 0.15
If she takes the exam, there are two outcomes. She either succeeds, yi = 1, or fails, yi = 0.16
The outcomes are associated with the following payoffs: a reward Ri > 0 if she succeeds and
a loss Li < 0 if she fails. If she does not take the exam, she neither experiences a reward,
nor a loss, and her payoff is zero. The student’s effort in studying determines the probability
distribution over outcomes. Formally, if she takes the exam, the probability that she succeeds
is
probi
(
yi = 1|wi = 1,ei
)={ p¯i for ei = 1,
p
¯ i
for ei = 0,
(1)
where 0 ≤ p
¯ i
< p¯i ≤ 1. We suppose that p¯iRi + (1− p¯i )Li > 0 and p
¯ i
Ri + (1−p
¯ i
)Li < 0, such
that the student optimally takes the exam if she has studied and does not take the exam if
she has not studied.17
Since students have to study before the exam and thus also before the outcome is rea-
lized, their intertemporal preferences play an important role for their decisions. It is well-
known that activities which involve immediate costs and delayed rewards are prone to pro-
crastination (Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2002). As O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999) and many others, we use the β−δ model to allow for time-inconsistent and present-
biased preferences.18 If student i wants to take the exam (and thus signs up for it), her ex-
pected discounted utility when deciding about her study effort is
ui (wi = 1,ei )=βiδτi
[
probi
(
yi = 1|wi = 1,ei
)
Ri +
(
1−probi
(
yi = 1|wi = 1,ei
))
Li
]
−χi (ei ), (2)
where τ > 0 is the time distance between the effort investment and the outcome, δi ∈ (0,1]
the long-run discount factor, and β the present bias parameter. For βi = 1 the student’s pre-
14We later discuss the case of continuous effort.
15Note that our results do not change if students first have to decide whether to take the exam or not and then
decide how much effort to invest in studying.
16One can easily allow for more than two outcomes; see the short analysis below.
17Note that if p¯iRi + (1− p¯i )Li < 0, student i will not take the exam. And this holds true even if her costs of
studying are zero. We later discuss this case.
18See also the pioneering studies of Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997).
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ferences are time-consistent, while for βi < 1 her preferences are present-biased and time-
inconsistent. Because taking the exam is only optimal if the student invests effort, we can
simplify (2) to
ui (wi = 1)=βiδτi
[
p¯iRi +
(
1− p¯i
)
Li
]− ci . (3)
In contrast, if she does not want to take the exam (and thus does not sign up for it), her
expected discounted utility is
ui (wi = 0,ei )=βiδτi 0−χ(ei ). (4)
In this case, she optimally does not invest effort in studying and we can simplify (4) to
ui (wi = 0)= 0. (5)
Comparing formulas (3) and (5) reveals that student i decides to study and take the exam if
and only if19
βiδ
τ
i
[
p¯iRi +
(
1− p¯i
)
Li
]− ci ≥ 0. (6)
From (6) we see that the student is more eager to study and take the exam if she has time-
consistent preferences, βi = 1, than when she is plagued by time-inconsistent preferences,
βi < 1. Time-inconsistent preferences can thus discourage the student from studying and
taking the exam. Supposing that studying and taking the exam is economically optimal,20
i.e., that
δτi
[
p¯iRi +
(
1− p¯i
)
Li
]− ci ≥ 0, (7)
the student studies and takes the exam if and only if
βi ≥ β¯i := ci
δτi
[
p¯iRi +
(
1− p¯i
)
Li
] . (8)
Thus, in order to be motivated to study and take the exam, the student must have time-
consistent preferences or, if she has time-inconsistent preferences, her present-bias must be
sufficiently low. Time inconsistency and the resulting procrastination behavior is empirically
indeed a major problem among students; see the discussion and the references in Section 1.
19As a tie-breaking rule, we suppose that the student takes the exam in case of indifference. Such knife-edge
cases have probability mass zero and are not important for our results.
20Formula (7) expresses that, at least before the time they have to study, students want to take the exam.
The case where (7) does not hold is simple: The student does not want to study and take the exam, no matter
whether her preferences are time consistent or not.
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2.1 Soft commitment device
We are interested in the effects that policy interventions have on student behavior. Sup-
pose students sign a non-binding agreement, where they declare that they will adhere the
officially recommended exam schedule. To incorporate this soft commitment device in the
model, we let student i experience an additional payoff (or forgone loss) of Zi > 0 if she takes
the exam. The idea is that if the student signs the agreement, her reference point is to take
the exam. If she follows this plan, she experiences satisfaction, whereas she suffers dissatis-
faction if she fails to follow the plan.21 A fraction of Zi could also be due to the recognition
(or forgone disrespect) the student receives from others (e.g., her classmates, professors, or
the dean) when she signs the agreement and follows the plan.22 23
If the student uses the soft commitment device, her expected discounted utility from
studying and taking the exam is
ui (wi = 1)|SCD =βiδτi
[
p¯iRi +
(
1− p¯i
)
Li +Zi
]− ci , (9)
while her utility from not taking the exam is ui (wi = 0)|SCD = 0. The student optimally stu-
dies and takes the exam if and only if
βi ≥ β¯i
∣∣
SCD :=
ci
δτi
[
p¯iRi +
(
1− p¯i
)
Li +Zi
] . (10)
Comparing the thresholds with and without the soft commitment device reveals that, while
both thresholds are positive and below one, the threshold with the soft commitment device
is lower than the threshold without the soft commitment device:
0< β¯i
∣∣
SCD < β¯i < 1. (11)
2.2 Main insights
We obtain the following insights. First, the soft commitment device does not influence the
behavior of students with perfectly time-consistent preferences, β = 1, but possibly that of
students with time-inconsistent preferences, β < 1. Second, the soft commitment device
incentivizes some types of students to study and take the exam. That is, there are types of
21See Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1991), and Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
22Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Carrillo and Dewatripont (2008), and Vanberg (2008) – among others –
investigate how promises can affect behavior.
23The analysis of the model stays unchanged if the agreement could have hard consequences, like being
expelled by the dean. However, in our field experiment, we explicitly explain to students that signing the
agreement does not lead to any hard consequences.
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students that study and take the exam with the soft commitment device, but that do not
study and take it without the soft commitment device. Third, the converse is not true. That
is, every student that studies and takes the exam without the soft commitment device also
studies and takes it with the soft commitment device.
Taking together the previous insights, the soft commitment device at least weakly incre-
ases the study effort and willingness to take the exam of every single student. Thus, for every
student, the probability of passing the exam at least weakly increases. The number of stu-
dents that study, and take and pass the exam is hence at least weakly higher with the soft
commitment device than without. Under a mild condition, the relationship is strict. Sup-
pose that in some initial period, student i ’s type (ci ,Ri ,Li ,p
¯ i
, p¯i ,βi ,δi ,Zi ) is drawn from
the cumulative distribution function Fi (·). The expected number of students that study
and take the exam is
∑n
i=1prob
(
βi ≥ β¯i
)
without the soft commitment device, while it is∑n
i=1prob
(
βi ≥ β¯i
∣∣
SCD
)
with the soft commitment device. Given that there is at least some
probability mass between β¯i
∣∣
SCD and β¯i for at least one student i ∈ {1, ...,n}, the expected
number of students that study and take the exam is strictly higher with the soft commitment
device than without it. Since the probability of passing the exam after studying is positive,
i.e., p¯i > 0, the expected number of students that pass the exam is also strictly higher with
the soft commitment device than without it.
2.3 Discussion
We next briefly examine the implications of our model. Robustness issues are explored in
the Appendix.
Willingness to take up the soft commitment device. When is it optimal for a student to
sign the agreement, i.e., to use the soft commitment device? First, if the agreement causes
additional payoffs, students’ state specific utilities at least weakly increase, such that it is
optimal to sign the agreement. Second, suppose the agreement causes no additional payoffs
in case students take the exam, but only additional losses in case students do not take the
exam. Signing the agreement is then still weakly optimal for students that will take the exam
for sure. Students that have time-inconsistent preferences and are naive24 might expect that
they will take the exam for sure, and thus also sign the agreement, although they actually do
not take the exam for sure. For sophisticated students with time-inconsistent preferences,
the agreement could be a valuable commitment device that helps them to follow their initial
plan of taking the exam.25
24Sophisticated agents foresee that they will have self-control problems in the future. Naive agents do not
foresee these self control problems. This distinction goes back to O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
25For a discussion on the value of commitment, see O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
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The above arguments are in stark contrast to hard commitment devices. As carefully ex-
plained by Laibson (2015), empirically as well as theoretically, individuals are seldom willing
to use hard commitment devices. On the one hand, hard commitment devices create costs
by restricting the freedom and flexibility of individuals. On the other hand, hard commit-
ment devices create benefits by mitigating procrastinatory behavior. However, unless fully
sophisticated, individuals systematically underestimate these benefits. It is thus often the
case that the perceived benefits of a hard commitment device fall short of its total costs. This
holds true especially if the total costs do not only include the costs from restricted freedom
and flexibility, but also hassle costs (e.g., the time to set up the device and the system of
enforcement) or direct payments necessary to obtain the device.
Multiple exams. According to the official curriculum, students should take several exams
in every semester. To incorporate this, let each student decide on the set of exams {1, ...,m}.
Student i ∈ {1, ..,n} optimally studies for and takes exam j ∈ {1, ...,m} if and only if
βi ≥ β¯ ji
∣∣∣
SCD
:= c
j
i
δτ
j
i
[
p¯ ji R
j
i +
(
1− p¯ ji
)
L ji +Z
j
i
] , (12)
given that she uses the soft commitment device, and
βi ≥ β¯ ji :=
c ji
δτ
j
i
[
p¯ ji R
j
i +
(
1− p¯ ji
)
L ji
] , (13)
given that she does not use the soft commitment device. Since the soft commitment device
at least weakly increases each students’ study effort and willingness to take exam j , and this
holds for all exams j ∈ {1, ...,m}, the device at least weakly increases the expected number of
exams taken and passed by every student and in total. As before, under a mild condition, the
expected number of exams taken and passed by every student and in total strictly increases
due to the device.
Pure reminders. We empirically also examine a treatment where students receive remin-
ders, but cannot use a commitment device. Such pure reminders could potentially influence
student behavior via two channels. First, if the exams do not have high salience for students,
they may not generate much motivation to invest study effort. Pure reminders may increase
students’ awareness and thus promote their efforts and willingness to take the exam. Se-
cond, due to pure reminders, the students’ perception of the exams’ importance may rise,
which in turn may positively affect their study efforts and willingness to take the exam.26
26For classical discussions of framing, salience and perception effects, i.e., context-dependent choices, see
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Kahneman and Tversky (1984). For a modern economical salience theory,
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3 The field experiment
We conduct a field experiment with the incoming cohort of business administration stu-
dents in the bachelor’s program of a German University.27 Figure 1 outlines the design of the
experiment and Figure 2 details the key events in the course of the experiment.
A total of 392 students enrolled, and were scheduled to start their studies in October.
We randomly assign students to three treatments: control, reminder, and commitment de-
vice.28 At the beginning of the semester, we then use the first session of the statistics class to
begin our treatments. For this session only, students are assigned to three different lecture
halls according to their treatment group and receive a standardized introductory lecture on
how to best organize their studies.29 To increase participation in the introductory lecture, in
late September we post an announcement on the university website and on the online study
platform. The announcement advises students that in the first session of the class they will
be given important information on how to organize their studies, and urges them to there-
fore attend. We also let them know that they will have to show their student ID card and that
they will have to pick up a personalized information folder before the lecture. No further
information about the contents of the introductory lecture is given.
3.1 Introductory lecture
In the first week of classes, students show up for the introductory lecture. At a central infor-
mation desk, they show their student ID card and receive the information folders. The fol-
ders carry stickers which prominently display the randomly assigned lecture hall. Students
then head to their assigned hall, where student helpers at the door check that everyone is
entering the correct hall. The information desk and the pickup procedure can be seen in
Figure 3.
see Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013).
27The university had made it one of its priorities to find measures which can improve the academic per-
formance of their students. In this context it introduced a program which is part of the multi-billion Euro
“Qualitätspakt Lehre” (Quality Agreement on Teaching) funded by the German Ministry of Education. The ex-
plicitly stated goal of the program is to increase the rate of passed exams and to reduce dropout rates. The
university invested the grant money into standard measures such as e.g. small group tutorials and student self-
assessments. In this context we implemented an intervention that is far less expensive than such traditional
measures. For our investigations we also utilized the data collected to evaluate the self-assessment.
28In the randomization, we block on age, sex, and final high school grade.
29The randomization across lecture halls is in effect only for the introductory lecture. During the semester
some lectures have parallel sessions due to the large number of participants. In this case, the student office as-
signs students to sessions according to the first letter of their last name, i.e., independently of which treatment
group they are in. Irrespective of our treatment assignment and any lexicographic assignment to parallel class
sessions during the semester, all students in a class take the same exact exam at the end of the semester.
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To ensure that all students possess the same information, and to establish the same set
of goals in all treatment groups, students receive a standardized introductory lecture, called
’Study with a Plan’, in all three lecture halls. All three lecturers use the same slides and were
given the same precise and detailed instructions on which subjects to cover, which informa-
tion to provide, and how to respond to questions the students might have. The lecture gives
an overview of what is expected from the students in the first four semesters, and provides
an exam plan recommending five exams per semester. Students are urged to stick to this
schedule. The information folder contains the same information in writing; see Figures 13
to 18.
Up to this point, there are no differences between the three lecture halls. In fact, both
the control group and the reminder treatment receive completely identical introductory lec-
tures, since the reminders that we later send are not announced at this point. The only va-
riation takes place in the commitment group. The information folder for this group also
contains two unsigned copies of an agreement, by which students can voluntarily commit to
the recommended exam schedule; see Figures 19 and 20). We emphasize that the agreement
can help them achieve their goals, but that it is non-binding and failure to comply carries no
further consequences besides forgoing the credit for passed exams. The agreement is thus a
soft commitment device. We ask those who choose to sign the agreement to return one copy
to us and keep the second copy.
Of the 129 students in the commitment group, 14 students did not show up for the intro-
ductory lecture. All 115 students who took part in the lecture chose to sign the agreement.
This high rate of participation is perfectly in line with our theoretical model (see Section 2.3)
and shows that there is indeed a large demand for commitment among university students.30
We keep all randomized students in the analysis, irrespective of whether they showed up for
the introductory lecture (in the control and all treatment groups). Due to the high rate of par-
ticipation, differences between intention to treat and treatment on the treated effects will not
be large and driven exclusively by those who did not show up to the introductory lecture. In
the results section, we will thus prominently feature the intention to treat effects, which are
probably also of more interest from a policy point of view.
30There can be other effects on participation that we do not capture in our model. Students may want to sig-
nal their quality by participating (Exley and Naecker 2015). Moreover, knowing that others sign the agreement
may create peer pressure. It is worth mentioning that all letters contained a phone number and an email ad-
dress that students could turn to. There were no inquiries or complaints regarding the the commitment device
– which tentatively suggests that students did not feel forced to sign the agreement.
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3.2 Exam sign-up reminders
In November, students have roughly two weeks to sign up for the exams online (see Figure
2). While the exam plan recommends five exams, students were free to sign up for fewer or
more exams than that. Signing up for an exam is a prerequisite for later taking part in it, but
students can also withdraw from participation.
In the week before the sign-up starts, students of the reminder and the commitment
groups receive an unannounced letter in the mail, reminding them to sign up for the exams
(see Figures 21 to 24). In the commitment group the letter states that “surely you remember
the introductory lecture to ’Study with a Plan’, which took place in the context of the statis-
tics class. In this lecture you were given important information on how to best organize your
studies and you have signed a target agreement with us”.31 It continues: “In the period from
18 Nov - 29 Nov please use the university web site to sign up for at least the following exams”,
and then lists the recommended five exams. Only one slight variation distinguishes the sign-
up reminder of the commitment group from that of the reminder group: for the latter, we
deleted the phrase “and you have signed a target agreement with us”.
3.3 Study reminders
Once students have signed up for exams, it is crucial that they also spend time studying for
the exams. In early December, students of the reminder and the commitment groups thus
receive another reminder letter (see Figures 25 to 28). It recommends to start preparing for
the upcoming exams already before the Christmas break, and once more stresses that the
exam plan schedules five exams. For the commitment group, the letter again mentions the
agreement, and we enclose a copy of the signed personal agreement in the envelope. This is
the last time we contact the students before the exam week, which takes place at the end of
January.
3.4 Descriptive statistics and randomization
The 392 students in the incoming cohort are on average 21.5 years old and have obtained
a final high school grade of 2.66.32 Roughly half the cohort starts their studies immediately
after graduating from high school (we label this variable a “fresh HS degree”) and half the
31Students in the commitment group who did not sign or were not present at the introductory lecture receive
no reminder letters.
32The final grades in the German system range from 1 (best) to 4 (worst passing grade).
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cohort has a high school degree from the general secondary track.33 The university where
we conduct the experiment draws a large share of its students from the surrounding areas:
most students have obtained their high school degree in the states of Bavaria (67%) or Baden-
Wuerttemberg (19%). Female students account for 51% of the cohort and 5% of students do
not hold a German passport.
Randomization was carried out using stratification and balancing. We stratified on final
high school grade (four strata) and balanced on all covariates that were available to us at the
time of randomization: final high school grade, age, and gender. Table 2 shows that these va-
riables are balanced across our control and treatment groups. Most importantly, there is no
difference in final high school grade, which is generally considered to be a strong predictor
for success in university. As can be seen in the table, there are also no large differences across
the three experimental groups in terms of the observable characteristics for which we recei-
ved data from the student office only after the semester ended and which we use as controls
in some of our estimations. One exception is the geographical origin of our subjects: Stu-
dents from Baden-Wuerttemberg are under-represented in the commitment group and we
will therefore include state fixed effects in some specifications, along with controls for the
stratification and balancing covariates (as is recommended to be standard practice in Bruhn
and McKenzie 2009).34
3.5 Outcome variables
We measure three main outcomes, at two different points in time: the number of exams that
students sign up for in November, and the number of exams participated in and passed in
January.
From the descriptive statistics in the control group we can gather some intuition as to
how much room there is for the interventions to improve student performance. Figure 5
shows that 88.6% of students in the control group sign up for at least five exams, as recom-
mended; on average, they sign up for 4.5 exams. This high number may be due to the exam
modalities, by which signing up for an exam and then not showing up carries no penalty, i.e.,
the exam does not count as failed.
The numbers are very different when it comes to exam participation. Only 66.4% of stu-
dents in the control group participate in five or more exams; on average, they participate in
33Germany has a tracked secondary school system, and two types of secondary school degree are eligible to
enter tertiary education: the general track degree (“Abitur”) and the vocational track degree (“Fachhochschul-
reife” (FOS)). Roughly 5% of students hold other degrees that are also recognized in the German system.
34Students who could not be reached by physical mail and therefore received email reminders were also
unequally distributed across the groups, and we add an indicator variable. However, their number is very small
(n=5, four of which in the commitment group and one in the reminder group).
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only 4.0 exams. The numbers are even lower for passed exams. After the first semester, only
46.5% of students in the control group have passed five exams as prescribed by the exam
plan; on average, they have passed only 3.4 exams. This means that more than half of the
students are not on track for a timely graduation very early on in their study program. The
potential for improving student performance in the dimensions of exam participation and
passed exams is thus substantial.
4 Results
We next report intention-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-on-the-treated (TT) effects of our in-
terventions on student performance, as measured by the number of exams that students
sign up for, participate in, and pass.
4.1 Intention to treat effects
We first provide intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates from OLS models and compare the average
outcomes of the control and treatment groups.
The baseline specification is:
Y ki =α0+α1Remindi +α2Commi ti +εi , (14)
whereY ki denotes the level of outcome measure k (exam sign-up, exam participation, or pas-
sed exams) for individual i . Remindi andCommi ti are indicators for being in the reminder
or the commitment device group, respectively.
For the second specification, we follow the recommendations in Bruhn and McKenzie
(2009) and control for the method of randomization, by including as covariates the variables
that were used for stratification and balancing. The vector Xi contains these variables (high
school grade, age, gender) plus a set of state fixed effects, indicating a student’s geographic
origin:
Y ki =α0+α1Remindi +α2Commi ti +Xiα3+εi . (15)
In the third specification, we add a vector of control variables Zi, to which we did not
have access at the time of randomization, but which were made available to us at the end of
the semester:
Y ki =α0+α1Remindi +α2Commi ti +Xiα3+Ziα4+εi . (16)
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Zi includes indicators for whether the student applied in the later half of the application pe-
riod, whether the student started college immediately after high school, German nationality,
high school degree type, and whether the student received reminders via email rather than
physical mail.
Effects of the commitment treatment. The number of exams signed up for is 4.5 in the
control group, and being in the commitment treatment increases this number by roughly .3
exams; see the baseline specification in Column (1) of Table 3. In the second specification
(Column 2) the effect is somewhat larger (the reference person is a 20 year old female Bava-
rian student), and adding all controls in the third specification leaves the coefficient virtually
unchanged (Column 3). In the commitment group, less than 8% sign up for fewer than five
exams, whereas 11.5% do in the control group (see Figure 6, which shows how the treatment
affects the distribution of sign-up, participation, and passing). The effect on sign-up is sta-
tistically significant and of rather large magnitude, given that the control group is already
very close to the five exams recommended by the university.
We also find a positive effect of the commitment treatment on exam participation. Parti-
cipation in the control group is 4.0 exams and being assigned to the commitment treatment
increases this number by more than .4 exams; see Column (4) for the baseline specifica-
tion. Adding controls produces very similar coefficients of up to half an additional exam
taken (Columns 5 and 6).35 This constitutes a significant increase in exams taken of roughly
a quarter standard deviation (the standard deviation of exams taken in the control group is
1.77).
The fact that students in the commitment group sign up for additional exams already
shows that the commitment device can indeed change behavior. Moreover, the fact that
students who were offered the commitment device also participate in more exams suggests
that this is a lasting effect, in the sense that the commitment device is also effective in helping
students follow through in taking the exams some months later. This is interesting in itself,
but for students to merely sign up for and participate in more exams does not carry much
value if they do not manage to pass these exams.
Accordingly, the most important outcome measure is the number of passed exams. Each
of the exams that the students are supposed to take in the first semester is worth the same
amount of credits, and we find that students in the commitment group pass roughly half an
extra exam at the end of the semester. This holds in the baseline specification (Column 7),
35The point estimates for additional sign-up are smaller than the point estimates for additional exams parti-
cipated in. One might therefore be inclined to infer that being in the commitment treatment also increases the
probability of participating in exams that students would have also signed up for in absence of the treatment.
However, the difference between the coefficients in the sign-up and participation estimations is not statistically
significant.
17
and after adding controls (Columns 8 and 9), suggesting a significant increase of roughly .22
standard deviations (the standard deviation of exams passed in the control group is 1.92).36
So in line with the predictions of our simple decision model, those in the commitment group
not only take more exams, they also pass more exams.
Effects of the reminder treatment. As we can see from Table 2, being assigned to the remin-
der treatment never elicits any significant effect and none of the coefficients is even close to
being significant. This holds for all three outcome variables (sign up, participation, and pas-
sing) and all three specifications. The fact that reminding students is not enough to improve
their performance suggests that low salience is not a problem for the university students.
Controls. Looking at the control variables in Table 3, it can be seen that for exam sign-
up, none of them are statistically significant.37 When it comes to participation, being non-
German and having applied late in the application period are associated with a lower num-
ber of exams taken. For passed exams, being non-German and a late application are linked
to passing fewer exams, while having a high school degree of the “other” type (not of the Abi-
tur or FOS type, see Footnote 33) is associated with passing more exams. Most importantly,
the final high school grade is a strong predictor of exams passed: a one standard deviation
better high school grade (sd in the control group= 0.41) increases passed exams by around
.15 standard deviations. When compared to the effects of our commitment device, this de-
monstrates the large potential of behavioral interventions in education.
4.2 Treatment effects on the treated
So far we have explored the ITT effects, which inform us about the causal effect of offering
students a commitment device. From a policy perspective the ITT effect is relevant, because
it allows to assess the average effects of such interventions on the entire cohort. We also
want to quantify the effect that the treatment has on those that are actually treated, i.e., in
our case, the effect the soft commitment device has on those that felt compelled to enter into
the agreement.
36With regards to grading, the official study regulations of the university state that the “individual perfor-
mance of the student” determines the grade – there is no provision for relative grading or grading on the curve.
In addition, it is important to realize that only one third of students receives the commitment device, and only
half of those who receive the treatment also respond with behavioral changes (as we will show in the section
on identifying procrastinators). This means that even if some lecturer were to apply relative grading practices
despite the above university regulations, our treatments are unlikely to affect the passing threshold in signifi-
cant ways.
37In all specifications that include controls, some of the age and state (“Bundesland”) fixed effects are statis-
tically significant, specifically some of the groups with lower cell count (older students and students that are
from far away states). Since we did not have information on geographic origin at the time of randomization,
these small groups of students are not balanced across treatments (see the descriptives in Table 2). As can be
seen in Table 3, the inclusion of these variables thus slightly changes the estimated effects of our treatments.
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We offer the soft commitment device as a voluntary means to overcome problems with
procrastination and thereby improve performance. Some subjects who are offered the treat-
ment therefore receive no treatment. In our case, these subjects are the ones that do not sign
the agreement and/or do not receive the letters. Of the 129 student that were assigned to the
commitment group, 14 did not sign the agreement, in all cases because they were not pre-
sent at the introductory lecture. These students did not receive any letters, but they are still
analyzed as being part of the commitment treatment. In the reminder group, 17 students
did not show up for the introductory lecture. We did not send any letters to these students,
either, and they are also kept in the analysis. Simply comparing the outcomes for those who
actually received the commitment or reminder treatment to the control group could pro-
duce biased estimates, due to differential selection into attending the lectures and signing
the agreement. Because there are no always-takers – students in the control group cannot
use the commitment agreement – the treatment effect on the treated (TT) can be calcula-
ted as the local average treatment effect, using randomized assignment to the commitment
group as an instrumental variable:
Agreementi =β0+β1Remindi +β2Commi ti +Xiβ3+Ziβ4+εi , (17)
Let teri = δ0+δ1Remindi +δ2Commi ti +Xiδ3+Ziδ4+εi , (18)
Y ki = γ0+γ1Let teri +γ2Agreementi +Xiγ3+Ziγ4+εi . (19)
Equation (17) is the first stage for the commitment agreement, where assignment to the com-
mitment group generates exogenous variation in signing the agreement. The first stage for
receiving the pure reminder letter is given in Equation (18). The second stage is shown in
(19) and it provides an estimate of the effect that the agreement/reminder has on those that
signed/received it.
Table 4 displays the TT effects we obtain from the instrumental variable estimations. The
specifications are the same as in the ITT estimations shown in Table 3. The bottom panel
shows the first-stage coefficients of being assigned to the reminder or commitment group
(controls are not shown). As expected from the participation numbers mentioned above,
the TT effects of the commitment device are 11.1% (1/.902) and the reminder coefficients
11.5% (1/.866) larger than the respective ITT effects.
4.3 Exam specific results
An interesting question is whether the effects of our treatments differ across exams. While we
do not have information on sign-up for the individual exams, we are able to assess the effects
on participation and passing for each of the five main exams that the university recommends
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to take in the first semester: Accounting, Statistics, Business Administration, Organization,
and Law.38
Tables 5 and 6 display the effects on sign-up, participation, and passing from linear pro-
bability models. The effects in the individual exams can be seen in Columns (1) through (5),
and Column (6) shows the aggregate effect on the five main exams the school suggests to
take (ITT in the top panel, TT in the bottom panel). The zero effect of the reminder we have
seen earlier could theoretically mask heterogeneous effects across the individual exams. Yet
we find no significant effect of the reminder treatment on either participation or passing in
any individual exam. The effects of commitment on participation and passing on the other
hand are particularly large in the Statistics and Accounting exams: the commitment device
significantly increases participation by 12.2 and 10.0 percentage points respectively, and stu-
dents in the commitment group were 16.6 and 15.6 percentage points more likely to pass the
accounting and the statistics exam. Of the other three exams individually, only in the law
exam we find a marginally significant effect of commitment. Importantly, however, all point
estimates are positive, indicating that the general effect of the commitment device goes in
the same direction across all exams.
We propose two channels that can plausibly generate the observed commitment coef-
ficients. First, a common characteristic of the Statistics and the Accounting exam is that
mathematics is a substantial factor. Mathematical subjects are a stumbling block for many
students already in high school, and the passing rates in these two “numerical” exams are
rather low (see Figure 7). The (psychological) costs of starting to study for these exams may
therefore be particularly high – making procrastination potentially more prevalent in com-
parison to exams that require a different set of skills, such as learning by heart and reitera-
ting. Consequently, the commitment device may be more helpful in mathematical subjects
(Column 7 shows the combined “numerical exams” effect in Statistics and Accounting).
Second, the Statistics and the Accounting exams take place on the first two days of the
exam week (Figure 8 displays the sequence of exams with the corresponding coefficients). If
our treatment leads students to focus more strongly on early exams, then this could explain
the observed pattern. Alternatively, higher motivation or focus induced by the commitment
device may deplete over the course of the exam week. If the arrangement of exams in time
rather than the mathematical content of exams drives the differential effects, then it can be
wise to schedule exams that are considered stumbling blocks towards the beginning of the
exam period.
38The student office could only supply the total number of exams signed up for, so we do not know for which
specific exams a student did actually sign up for. Since students at this school can simply not show up for an
exam without this resulting in a failed exam, we cannot infer sign-up from the exam results.
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4.4 Comparison to other interventions
We have shown that a soft commitment device is a simple and effective instrument to en-
hance educational progress. Students sign up for, participate in, and pass more exams – with
effect sizes of up to .25 standard deviations. It is instructive to compare these effects to those
of other interventions and institutional factors studied in the literature on higher education.
Dobkin, Gil and Marion (2010) estimate the effect of requiring weaker students to attend
class at university. Using a regression discontinuity design, they find that a 10 percentage
point increase in attendance is linked to a .17 standard deviations increase in performance.
When it comes to offering monetary incentives to increase performance in higher educa-
tion, the evidence is mixed. De Paola, Scoppa and Nisticò (2012) find that offering college
students a merit scholarship increases performance by .18 standard deviations. On the ot-
her hand, Angrist, Oreopoulos and Williams (2014) find no statistically significant effect of
offering university students monetary rewards for better academic performance. See also
the survey of the literature on monetary incentives in Lavecchia, Liu and Oreopoulos (2014).
Using data from a UK university, Bandiera, Larcinese and Rasul (2010) find that reducing
the number of students in a lecture increases academic performance and estimate an effect
size of .108. The quality of the instructional staff also positively affects outcomes. Carrell
and West (2010) use the random allocation of students to professors at the United States Air
Force Academy to explore the effects of professor quality. They find a positive impact on
academic performance with an effect size of .05. Carrell, Fullerton and West (2009) estimate
that the quality of peers has a somewhat larger effect on performance; the effect size is .08.
Thus, while the effects of our soft commitment device on students’ performance are quite
large, they do not seem to be unreasonable in comparison to other education interventions
– especially if one takes into account that commitment devices generally deliver rather large
effects (see the introduction).
5 Procrastinators and commitment
Motivated by the theoretical prediction of our model that the soft commitment device is es-
pecially helpful for students who tend to procrastinate, we next seek to identify procrastina-
tors and explore the effects of the commitment device on their behavior. In what follows, we
introduce a measure of procrastination derived from administrative application records. We
then provide evidence that being a procrastinator is indeed unfavorably related to exam per-
formance in university. Finally, we can show that the commitment device drastically impro-
ves the performance of those identified as procrastinators. In fact, it fully offsets the initial
performance deficit of procrastinators.
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5.1 Identifying procrastinators
Specific information on the individual level of procrastination is typically not available. Even
if it is available, the measures are often self-reported in surveys, which is problematic if in-
dividuals are (partially) naive about their procrastination. If students are unable to correctly
assess their own behavior, any self-reported measures are flawed. The same is true if re-
spondents answer such questions in a way that they believe to be socially desirable. Thus,
a particularly promising way to identify an individual’s procrastination tendencies is to look
at actual behavior, rather than self reports.
We use administrative information from the university about the specific time at which
every student submitted online the application for the business administration program.39
The application period for German university programs typically runs from the beginning
of May to mid-July. After the application period closes, the universities decide on whom
they admit to their program. Students are free to apply to more than one program and they
can submit their application at their convenience at any time in the application period. In
this context it is important to note that because students get no admission letters from any
university before mid-July, the later applications are not from those students who have al-
ready been rejected by another program (as might be the case in the U.S., for example). If
we interpret applying early as indicative for taking care of things right away, as opposed to
putting them off until the last minute, then we can use the application date as a proxy for
procrastination tendencies. To be clear, this does not mean that everyone who applies late is
a procrastinator. But if someone is a procrastinator, they will show up in the data as someone
who applied late.
Figure 9 shows the distribution of incoming applications in the period from May 2 to July
12. It has two peaks. The single day with the highest number of application is May 2, the
first day where applications are accepted. This points to pent up demand from people that
apply at the first opportunity. After that the number of applications per day slowly fades, but
starts to increase again noticeably in the latter half of the application period. The median
application date is June 15 and the last two weeks see many incoming applications.
We use two measures of procrastination. The first is the day of application. The second
is an indicator variable that distinguishes applicants who sent in their documents before the
39Technically, we do not have the exact date for all of our subjects, but we have application submission num-
bers for all subjects. These were assigned ascending in the order the applications were submitted. Because
we have time-stamps for students who also completed an online assessment center directly after submission
of the application, we can, in combination with the application number, infer the date of application for the
rest of the students. For all the results we report here, it does not make a difference whether we use the (non-
interpolated) application number or the (interpolated) application date. We use the latter measure, because it
is more intuitive and easier to interpret. The distribution of application numbers across the application period
is shown in Figure 12.
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median application date of June 15 from those who did so after June 15.40
5.2 Procrastination and exam performance without commitment
In the left column of Figure 10, we plot the relationship between application date and the
number of passed exams after the first semester. The plots are binned scatterplots, where
each of the six dots per group represents one sixth of the observations in the group. The
plots are corrected for the full set of controls used earlier (binned residual scatterplots).
Looking at the control group (“x” markers), we can see from the fitted line that there
is a clear negative relationship between applying later and the passing of exams. The top
graph shows that a student who applies very early, on average, passes about 3.75 exams,
whereas students that apply very late, on average, only pass less than 3 exams. The middle
and bottom graph show the same relationship for the five main exams recommended by the
university, and for the two numerical exams only. At first glance, it may seem surprising that
this relationship holds even when controlling for high school grades. However, university is
a new environment that is far less structured than high school and also provides much more
room for procrastination. Academic performance in college may therefore be affected by
procrastination more severely than in high school. The negative relationship between exam
performance and application date is very similar in the reminder group (square markers),
which is not particularly surprising, given that we did not find any effects of the reminders
earlier. Overall, this provides suggestive evidence that students who are prone to procrasti-
nation display lower levels of performance in the exams.41
5.3 Procrastination and exam performance with commitment
In theory, as we have laid out in Section 2, the commitment device should help students with
a tendency to procrastinate, whereas it is not expected to have any effect on non-procrastina-
tors. The binned scatterplot for the commitment group confirms this prediction (triangular
markers). Early appliers (i.e., the non-procrastinators) in the commitment group fare just
as well as the early appliers in the control group. At the same time the late appliers (which
include the procrastinators) who were offered the commitment device outperform the late
appliers in the control group. Interestingly, students who were randomized into the com-
mitment group perform just as well as the earliest applying students in the control group –
across the entire application period. This shows that the commitment device can actually
40The results are not sensitive to choosing a different cutoff date, as long as the two-peaked distribution is
captured by the procrastination variable.
41The same relationship can also be seen when looking at the link between application date and exam parti-
cipation (not shown).
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completely eliminate the negative effects of procrastination.42
We also examine regressions where we interact the indicator for being in the commit-
ment group with (a) the application date and (b) the indicator variable for having applied
before the median application date of June 15. The application date variable is coded in a
reverse fashion with 72 denoting the first day and 0 the last day of the application period.
The indicator variable takes on the value 0 for late appliers and 1 for early appliers. Thus,
in these specifications, the main effect of being offered the commitment device can be in-
terpreted as the effect for someone who (a) applies on the last day of the application period,
and (b) applies after the median application date.
Table 7 shows that the effects on sign-up, participation, and passing are roughly twice
as large for the last applicants in comparison to the average applicant (see the earlier re-
sults). When considering the median application date as a cutoff, it can be seen that for the
later half of applicants the effects are also considerably larger than for the earlier half (Table
8). In fact, the effects of the commitment device for the early appliers are very small and
not statistically significantly different from zero. The main effect of being a procrastinator,
i.e., applying later, is negative in both specifications (remember that a later application date
carries a smaller number here). It is statistically significant when using the continuous pro-
crastination measure and also significant in three of the six specifications when using the
crude division of the sample in two equal sized parts.
Taken together, these results show that procrastination seriously hinders academic per-
formance in university exams. Yet offering students a commitment device can completely
offset this handicap.
6 Are there negative side effects?
So far we have shown that the soft commitment device is an effective instrument to improve
student performance, as measured by sign-up for exams, participation in exams, and – most
importantly – passed exams. However, we have not considered the possibility that the higher
number of passed exams might come at a cost in terms of worse grades and higher failure
rates, or that the students might drop out at a higher rate due to the treatments.
Table 9 shows that the commitment treatment neither affects the probability of dropping
out, nor does it have an effect on the number of failed exams. The same is true for the remin-
42The right hand Column of Figure 10 shows the predicted number of passed exams at each application date
in the control and the commitment group with 95% confidence intervals. Underlying the plot are regressions
with the full set of controls and an interaction of the commitment treatment with application date. For clarity
of exposition, we do not display the predictions for the reminder group; essentially, they are the same as the
predictions for the control group. Results are almost identical to those derived from the scatterplots.
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der treatment. Even if students do not drop out with higher frequency and also do not fail in
more exams when treated, the higher number of passed exams may still come at the cost of
performing worse in these exams on average, i.e. receiving lower grades than students in the
control group. In other words, students may be trading quality for quantity. Table 10 shows
that neither of the two treatments leads to a lower grade point average in the passed exams,
see Columns (3) and (4). We obtain the same results if we include in the grade point average
also the exams that the students failed, see Columns (1) and (2).43 Figure 11 also shows that
there is no bunching of grades at the passing threshold of 4.0 and that the distribution of
grades in the treatment groups is statistically indistinguishable from the control group. It
is reassuring that we find no evidence for negative effects, as this confirms the theoretically
posited notion that the commitment device at least weakly increases all students’ efforts and
thus does not cause worse grades or higher failure rates.
7 Conclusion
Procrastination is a widespread phenomenon. It typically leads to unfavorable outcomes,
and the education domain is one where individuals are especially prone to delaying action.
In a simple model, we study a two dimensional intertemporal decision problem and show
that a soft commitment motivates students to increase their efforts and improve perfor-
mance. We provide supporting evidence for the theoretical considerations from a compa-
nion field experiment: Offering students a soft commitment device produces large positive
effects on the completion rate in a complex task – passing university exams.
The field experiment provides further insights. First, we have documented a negative
relationship between a revealed measure of procrastination and task performance. The soft
commitment then changes behavior in exactly those subjects for whom we would in theory
expect an effect: It drastically improves the rate of task completion in students identified as
procrastinators. In fact, our findings suggest that a soft commitment device can fully offset
the large initial performance deficit of these individuals.
Second, the experimental design allows us to gauge alternative pathways through which
soft commitment devices may affect behavior. Making sure – by way of the introductory
lecture – that all subjects are aware of the target number of passed exams suggests that diffe-
rences in information or goal setting do not drive the observed changes in behavior. With our
43Students pass more exams than without the treatment, at the same average passing grade as the controls.
This should actually lead to a better grade point average when the failed exams are also counted (as the lowest
grade possible). We do see the corresponding negative coefficients (recall that in the German system a lower
number denotes a better grade), but the effect is not significant. This small effect is due to the on average low
failure rates in the exams (Figure 7), as they imply that the grade point average is not strongly influenced by
failing grades.
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second treatment we can also rule out that it is merely a matter of keeping the task salient:
The reminders alone do not have the same effect on student behavior as the commitment;
in fact they do not change behavior at all. Similarly, getting help in planning is not sufficient
to affect student behavior.44 This can be inferred from the fact that the reminder treatment
does not lead to improved outcomes, despite the fact that it provides the same planning tools
(letters) as the commitment treatment.
From a policy perspective, our results have considerable implications. They suggest that
soft commitment devices can be very effective in helping students succeed. At a price of
single digit euros per student and semester, the commitment device is also particularly cost-
efficient. Moreover, there is no need for an external enforcement mechanism, because soft
commitments are self-enforcing by nature. On the demand side, we find an extremely high
willingness to take up the soft commitment. This ensures that the benefits of the commit-
ment can reach a large number of individuals; a property which we could not necessarily
expect from a hard commitment device. Importantly, the design of our intervention is ge-
neral enough to be implemented in a wide variety of environments, since none of the main
features is tied to a specific type of program or field of study, or even the field of education
altogether. This makes us confident that soft commitment devices can be a powerful means
to improve performance in non-trivial tasks – in education and beyond.
44For a brief overview on the economics of planning, see Beshears, Milkman and Schwartzstein (2016).
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Table 1: Description of Variables.
Variable Description
Treatment variables
Reminder Random assignment to the reminder treatment
Commitment Random assignment to the commitment contract treatment
Received reminder Students who received the reminder
Signed contract Students who signed the commitment contract
Balancing variables
Age Age in years
Male Indicator for being male
High School GPA Final high school grade point average (1=best, 4=worst)
Individual characteristics
Application date Runs from 72 (first day of application period=May 2) to 0 (last day of
application period=July 12)
Applied early Variable indicating students who applied on or before the
median application date (=June 15)
Fresh HS degree Students who start university in the year they graduated from high school
Foreigner Indicating foreign citizenship
HS degree FOS High school (HS) degree: vocational track degree
(“Fachhochschulreife (FOS)”)
HS degree Abitur HS degree: general track degree (“Abitur”)
Other degree Students who hold other school degrees than “FOS” or “Abitur”
HS degree State abbreviation Indicator for the federal state where students
obtained their HS degree (BW = Baden-Wuerttemberg;
BY = Bavaria; HE = Hesse; NI = Lower Saxony;
NW = North Rhine-Westphalia; RP = Rhineland-Palatinate; SL = Saarland;
SH = Schleswig-Holstein; TH = Thuringia; n.a. = not available)
Reminder via email Indicating students who could not be reached by physical mail
and received email reminders.
Outcome variables
Sign-up Number of exam sign-ups
Particip Number of exams participated in
Passing Number of exams passed
Exams failed Number of exams taken part in and failed
GPA Grade point average
Dropout Indicator for dropping out of the BA program during the first semester
Acct Accounting exam
MatStat Statistics/math exam
Busin Business administration exam
Orga Organization exam
Law Law exam
Main5 Five recommended exams: Acct, MatStat, Busin, Orga, Law
Num2 Two numerical exams : MatStat & Acct
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by treatment group, and balancing properties.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control Reminder Commitment (1) = (2)
p-value
(1) = (3)
p-value
Age 21.718 21.545 21.357 0.706 0.412
(0.309) (0.334) (0.312)
Male 0.504 0.455 0.504 0.426 0.999
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
High School GPA 2.659 2.658 2.662 0.981 0.949
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
Application date 37.168 41.220 39.682 0.205 0.432
(2.257) (2.251) (2.265)
Applied early 0.542 0.462 0.481 0.197 0.324
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Fresh HS degree 0.534 0.477 0.450 0.357 0.173
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Foreigner 0.069 0.038 0.054 0.267 0.630
(0.022) (0.017) (0.020)
HS degree FOS 0.542 0.500 0.581 0.497 0.524
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
HS degree Abitur 0.412 0.455 0.364 0.490 0.430
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
Other degree 0.046 0.045 0.054 0.989 0.755
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
HS degree in BW 0.229 0.220 0.116 0.857 0.016
(0.037) (0.036) (0.028)
HS degree in BY 0.626 0.629 0.628 0.962 0.974
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
HS degree in HE 0.061 0.038 0.116 0.388 0.118
(0.021) (0.017) (0.028)
HS degree in NI 0.000 0.008 0.016 0.320 0.154
(0.000) (0.008) (0.011)
HS degree in NW 0.015 0.030 0.023 0.416 0.641
(0.011) (0.015) (0.013)
HS degree in RP 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.320 0.315
(0.000) (0.008) (0.008)
HS degree in SL 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.158 .
(0.000) (0.011) (0.000)
HS degree in SH 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.155 0.160
(0.011) (0.000) (0.000)
HS degree in TH 0.008 0.000 0.016 0.316 0.554
(0.008) (0.000) (0.011)
HS degree in n.a. 0.046 0.053 0.078 0.788 0.289
(0.018) (0.020) (0.024)
Reminder via email 0.000 0.008 0.031 0.320 0.042
(0.000) (0.008) (0.015)
N 131 132 129
Note: Columns (1)-(3) display the means in the control and treatment groups, standard errors in parentheses. Columns (4) and (5) display t-
tests of equality of means. HS= high school, FOS= degree type ’Fachoberschule’, Name groups denote the lecture assignment based on first
letter of last name. HS degree BW= high school degree in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, BY= Bayern, HE= Hessen, NI= Niedersachsen,
NW= Nordrhein-Westfalen, RP= Rheinland-Pfalz, SL= Saarland, SH= Schleswig-Holstein, TH= Thueringen, n.a.= information not available.
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Table 3: Aggregate effects on sign-up, participation and credit points – OLS estimates (ITT).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sign-up Sign-up Sign-up Particip Particip Particip Passing Passing Passing
Treatments
Reminder 0.087 0.109 0.113 0.075 0.056 0.081 −0.090 −0.036 −0.024
(0.188) (0.188) (0.185) (0.220) (0.222) (0.218) (0.236) (0.239) (0.235)
Commitment 0.287∗ 0.357∗∗ 0.372∗∗ 0.458∗∗ 0.441∗∗ 0.490∗∗ 0.456∗∗ 0.527∗∗ 0.542∗∗
(0.169) (0.156) (0.159) (0.204) (0.202) (0.209) (0.227) (0.222) (0.225)
Balancing variables
Male 0.042 0.027 0.063 0.057 0.036 0.038
(0.139) (0.134) (0.174) (0.172) (0.191) (0.188)
High school GPA −0.040 0.025 −0.164 −0.045 −0.754∗∗∗ −0.674∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.180) (0.200) (0.200) (0.235) (0.235)
Individual characteristics
Application date −0.004 −0.011∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Fresh HS degree 0.047 0.144 0.024
(0.154) (0.209) (0.234)
Foreigner −0.504 −0.794∗ −0.834∗
(0.339) (0.467) (0.455)
HS degree Abitur −0.107 0.030 0.095
(0.194) (0.225) (0.242)
Other degree −0.197 0.460 0.939∗∗
(0.399) (0.386) (0.390)
Reminder via email −0.088 −0.587 −0.249
(0.393) (0.642) (0.599)
Constant 4.542∗∗∗ 4.674∗∗∗ 4.679∗∗∗ 4.038∗∗∗ 4.335∗∗∗ 4.171∗∗∗ 3.405∗∗∗ 3.802∗∗∗ 3.693∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.201) (0.250) (0.155) (0.234) (0.303) (0.168) (0.255) (0.321)
Age FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Note: Intention to treat estimates. The dependent variables are the number of exams signed up for, participated in, and passed. ’Reminder’ denotes
random assignment to the reminder treatment, ’Commitment’ denotes random assignment to the commitment contract treatment. Columns (2), (5)
and (8) include controls for the randomization balancing variables (male, age fixed effects, high school GPA) and state fixed effects. High school GPA and
application date are centered at the mean, the reference category for high school degree type is ’Fachoberschule’, for age it is the median (20 years) and
for state it is Bavaria. Columns (3), (6) and (9) add further controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Aggregate effects on sign-up, participation and credit points – IV estimates (TT).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sign-up Sign-up Particip Particip Passing Passing
2nd stage: treatments received(a)
Received reminder 0.127 0.129 0.066 0.093 −0.040 −0.027
(0.206) (0.198) (0.244) (0.235) (0.264) (0.254)
Signed contract 0.397∗∗ 0.410∗∗ 0.489∗∗ 0.540∗∗ 0.584∗∗ 0.596∗∗
(0.165) (0.165) (0.215) (0.217) (0.236) (0.235)
Balancing variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 392 392 392 392 392 392
1st stage dep. var: received reminder(b)
Reminder 0.866∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027)
1st stage F 457.90 520.26 457.90 520.26 457.90 520.26
N 392 392 392 392 392 392
1st stage dep. var: signed contract(c)
Commitment 0.902∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
1st stage F 707.38 696.40 707.38 696.40 707.38 696.40
N 392 392 392 392 392 392
Note: Intention to treat estimates. The dependent variables are the number of exams signed up for, participated
in, and passed. Panel (a) shows the treatment on the treated effects (TT), i.e. the second stage estimates. The
endogenous variables are the indicator variables for whether a student received the reminder and whether a
student signed the commitment contract. The instruments are indicator variables for the random assignment
to the reminder and the commitment contract treatment. Specifications are as in Columns (2), (3), (5), (6),
(8), (9) of table 3. Panel (b) shows the coefficient for the instrument ’assignment to the reminder group’ and
the first stage statistics for the first stage with ’received reminder’ as the dependent variable – controls are
not shown, but included in the estimations. Panel (c) shows the coefficient for the instrument ’assignment to
the commitment group’ and the statistics for the first stage with ’signed contract’ as the dependent variable
– controls are not shown, but included in the estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Effects on participation – individual exams, ITT (OLS) and TT (IV).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Acct MatStat Busin Orga Law Main5 Num2
Treatments (ITT)
Reminder 0.009 0.045 −0.025 −0.006 0.002 0.025 0.054
(0.047) (0.052) (0.051) (0.047) (0.047) (0.210) (0.089)
Commitment 0.100∗∗ 0.122∗∗ 0.059 0.069 0.077∗ 0.427∗∗ 0.222∗∗
(0.045) (0.052) (0.050) (0.044) (0.043) (0.203) (0.087)
Balancing variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Treatments (TT-IV)
Received reminder 0.011 0.052 −0.028 −0.007 0.002 0.029 0.062
(0.050) (0.056) (0.056) (0.051) (0.050) (0.227) (0.096)
Signed contract 0.110∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.065 0.076∗ 0.085∗ 0.470∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.053) (0.052) (0.045) (0.045) (0.210) (0.090)
Balancing variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for exam participation. The top panel shows the ITT estimates from linear probability models
for our treatments, TT (IV) estimates are displayed in the bottom panel. The endogenous variables are whether the student received a
reminder and whether a student signed the commitment contract, the instrument is random assignment to the respective treatments. All
estimations include the full set of controls as in columns (3), (6) and (9) of table 3. Columns (1)-(5) display effects in the 5 individual exams
recommended by the university. Column (6) shows the aggregate effect in those 5 exams. Column (7) is the effect in the two numerical
exams (Math/Statistics and Accounting) combined. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Effects on passing of exams – individual exams, ITT (OLS) and TT (IV).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Acct MatStat Busin Orga Law Main5 Num2
Treatments (ITT)
Reminder 0.059 −0.053 −0.045 −0.047 0.007 −0.080 0.006
(0.060) (0.062) (0.061) (0.051) (0.054) (0.227) (0.107)
Commitment 0.156∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.048 0.054 0.055 0.479∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.059) (0.062) (0.046) (0.052) (0.219) (0.104)
Balancing variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Treatments (TT-IV)
Received reminder 0.067 −0.061 −0.052 −0.054 0.008 −0.090 0.007
(0.064) (0.068) (0.066) (0.055) (0.058) (0.246) (0.116)
Signed contract 0.172∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.053 0.059 0.060 0.527∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.061) (0.065) (0.048) (0.055) (0.227) (0.108)
Balancing variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for having passed an exam. The top panel shows the ITT estimates from linear probability
models for our treatments, TT (IV) estimates are displayed in the bottom panel. The endogenous variables are whether the student received
a reminder and whether a student signed the commitment contract, the instrument is random assignment to the respective treatments. All
estimations include the full set of controls as in columns (3), (6) and (9) of table 3. Columns (1)-(5) display effects in the 5 individual exams
recommended by the university. Column (6) shows the aggregate effect in those 5 exams. Column (7) is the effect in the two numerical
exams (Math/Statistics and Accounting) combined. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Procrastination (I): Commitment interacted with day of application, 0= last day (ITT
effects, OLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sign-up Sign-up Particip Particip Passing Passing
Treatments
Reminder 0.144 0.135 0.111 0.108 0.016 0.000
(0.185) (0.184) (0.219) (0.219) (0.236) (0.236)
Commitment 0.799∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗ 1.001∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗
(0.255) (0.259) (0.336) (0.347) (0.351) (0.359)
Commit X App. day −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.014∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Balancing variables
Male 0.047 0.018 0.083 0.046 0.054 0.028
(0.139) (0.134) (0.171) (0.172) (0.189) (0.188)
High school GPA −0.010 0.002 −0.080 −0.072 −0.679∗∗∗ −0.700∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.181) (0.201) (0.199) (0.236) (0.233)
Individual characteristics
Application day 0.008∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Fresh HS degree 0.022 0.114 −0.005
(0.153) (0.207) (0.232)
Foreigner −0.457 −0.738 −0.782
(0.348) (0.498) (0.479)
HS degree Abitur −0.138 −0.007 0.060
(0.193) (0.224) (0.241)
Other degree −0.232 0.418 0.900∗∗
(0.408) (0.400) (0.407)
Reminder via email −0.146 −0.656 −0.314
(0.381) (0.661) (0.589)
Constant 4.345∗∗∗ 4.423∗∗∗ 3.735∗∗∗ 3.683∗∗∗ 3.250∗∗∗ 3.246∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.324) (0.319) (0.390) (0.327) (0.404)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 392 392 392 392 392 392
Note: Intention to treat estimates. The dependent variables are the number of exams signed up for, participated
in, and passed. ’Reminder’ denotes random assignment to the reminder treatment, ’Commitment’ denotes
random assignment to the commitment contract treatment. ’App. day’ denotes the day in the application
period on which the student applied: 0 denotes the last day, 72 the first day of the application period. All
estimations include controls for the randomization balancing variables (male, age fixed effects, high school
GPA) and state fixed effects. High school GPA is centered at the mean, the reference category for high school
degree type is ’Fachoberschule’, for age it is the median (20 years) and for state it is Bavaria. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Procrastination (II): Commitment interacted with having a below median (earlier)
application date (ITT effects, OLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sign-up Sign-up Particip Particip Passing Passing
Treatments
Reminder 0.136 0.127 0.098 0.095 0.003 −0.014
(0.187) (0.185) (0.223) (0.223) (0.239) (0.239)
Commitment 0.665∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.221) (0.299) (0.307) (0.308) (0.316)
Commit X App. early −0.595∗∗ −0.601∗∗ −0.642∗ −0.579∗ −0.797∗∗ −0.713∗
(0.253) (0.254) (0.342) (0.343) (0.372) (0.376)
Balancing variables
Male 0.058 0.028 0.096 0.054 0.062 0.031
(0.138) (0.134) (0.171) (0.171) (0.189) (0.187)
High school GPA −0.046 −0.033 −0.123 −0.107 −0.748∗∗∗ −0.769∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.175) (0.199) (0.198) (0.236) (0.234)
Individual characteristics
Applied early 0.275 0.268 0.527∗∗ 0.539∗∗ 0.430∗ 0.423∗
(0.183) (0.190) (0.230) (0.236) (0.247) (0.254)
Fresh HS degree 0.011 0.120 −0.032
(0.156) (0.208) (0.234)
Foreigner −0.462 −0.769 −0.784
(0.343) (0.490) (0.490)
HS degree Abitur −0.155 −0.033 0.008
(0.191) (0.221) (0.238)
Other degree −0.269 0.405 0.858∗∗
(0.408) (0.403) (0.424)
Reminder via email −0.103 −0.609 −0.263
(0.394) (0.678) (0.610)
Constant 4.499∗∗∗ 4.585∗∗∗ 4.001∗∗∗ 3.955∗∗∗ 3.529∗∗∗ 3.571∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.304) (0.296) (0.366) (0.304) (0.380)
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 392 392 392 392 392 392
Note: Intention to treat estimates. The dependent variables are the number of exams signed up for, participa-
ted in, and passed. ’Reminder’ denotes random assignment to the reminder treatment, ’Commitment’ denotes
random assignment to the commitment contract treatment. ’App. early’ is an indicator for having applied on
or before the median application date (=June 15). All estimations include controls for the randomization ba-
lancing variables (male, age fixed effects, high school GPA) and state fixed effects. High school GPA is centered
at the mean, the reference category for high school degree type is ’Fachoberschule’, for age it is the median (20
years) and for state it is Bavaria. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Effects on dropout and number of failed exams (ITT only, OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Dropout Exams
failed
Numerical
exams
failed
Treatments
Reminder 0.016 0.105 0.049
(0.022) (0.140) (0.084)
Commitment −0.007 −0.052 −0.100
(0.018) (0.134) (0.081)
Controls
High school GPA −0.020 0.631∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.131) (0.075)
Balancing variables Yes Yes Yes
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
N 392 392 392
Note: Intention to treat estimates. The dependent variable in (1) is
an indicator for having dropped out of the program by the end of the
first semester. In column (2) it is the total number of exams taken
part in and failed, columns (3) repeats this with the subsets of nume-
rical exams. ’Reminder’ denotes random assignment to the reminder
treatment, ’Commitment’ denotes random assignment to the com-
mitment contract treatment. All estimations include the full set of
controls as in columns (3), (6) and (9) of table 3. Robust standard er-
rors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 10: Effects on all grades (incl. failing), and passing grades only (ITT only, OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA
(all)
GPA
num2
(all)
GPA
(pass)
GPA
num2
(pass)
Treatments
Reminder 0.063 0.084 0.027 0.131
(0.100) (0.135) (0.069) (0.091)
Commitment −0.096 −0.127 −0.023 0.097
(0.102) (0.134) (0.076) (0.099)
Controls
High school GPA 1.002∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.137) (0.091) (0.106)
Balancing variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 346 340 341 290
Note: Intention to treat estimates. The dependent variable in (1) is the overall GPA, in co-
lumn (2) it is the GPA in the two numerical exams. In (1)-(2) the GPAs include the grade ’5’
(failing) for exams participated in and failed. Columns (3)-(4) use the same exams as in (1)-
(2) but do not count failing grades for the GPA. ’Reminder’ denotes random assignment to
the reminder treatment, ’Commitment’ denotes random assignment to the commitment
contract treatment. All estimations include the full set of controls as in the columns (3),
(6) and (9) of table 3. N is smaller than the respective group size, because some students
did not pass any exams in the semester and do not show up here. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
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Figure 3: THE INFORMATION DESK AND INFORMATION KIT PICKUP.
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Figure 22: SIGN-UP LETTER – COMMITMENT (ENGLISH). TEXT ADDED TO REMINDER LETTER
IN GREY.
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Figure 24: SIGN-UP LETTER – COMMITMENT (ORIGINAL). TEXT ADDED TO REMINDER LETTER
IN GREY.
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Figure 25: STUDY LETTER – REMINDER (ENGLISH).
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Figure 26: STUDY LETTER – COMMITMENT (ENGLISH). TEXT ADDED TO REMINDER LETTER IN
GREY.
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Figure 27: STUDY LETTER – REMINDER (ORIGINAL).
62
Figure 28: STUDY LETTER – COMMITMENT (ORIGINAL). TEXT ADDED TO REMINDER LETTER
IN GREY.
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Appendix: Robustness of the model
This section discusses the robustness of the model we analyzed in Section 2.
Reward and the soft commitment device. The soft commitment device may not only raise
the student’s utility of taking the exam, but also her reward of passing the exam. Formally,
the student’s payoff in case she succeeds, Ri , may increase. As we can see from formulas (3)
and (5), by the Envelope Theorem, dui (wi = 1)/dRi = ∂ui (wi = 1)/∂Ri = βiδτi p¯i > 0, while
dui (wi = 0)/dRi = 0. Thus, as long as p¯iRi + (1− p¯i )Li > 0 and p
¯ i
Ri + (1− p
¯ i
)Li < 0 hold
true45 – i.e., taking the exam is only optimal in case of learning – raising Ri has exactly the
same effect as raising Zi .
The case p¯iRi + (1− p¯i )Li ≤ 0. We have previously concentrated on the scenario where stu-
dents prefer to take the exam when they have studied. If this is not true, i.e., p¯iRi+(1−p¯i )Li ≤
0, the following results are immediate. This type of students does not take the exam without
a soft commitment device (even if preferences are time-consistent), but might be motivated
to study and take the exam with the soft commitment device. Thus, as with other types of
students, the soft commitment device at least weakly increases the study effort and willing-
ness to take the exam.
More outcomes. Suppose there are K > 2 possible outcomes for the student if she takes the
exam. We denote student i ’s payoff for outcome yk ∈
{
y1, ..., yK
}
byΨi ,k . Let the probability
of outcome yk when she invests effort ei = 1 be p¯ii ,k , while it is pi
¯ i ,k
if her effort is ei = 0. We
can then rewrite (3) as
ui (wi = 1)=βiδτi
K∑
k=1
p¯ii ,kΨi ,k − ci . (20)
The thresholds are thus
β¯i = ci
δτi
∑K
k=1 p¯ii ,kΨi ,k
and β¯i
∣∣
SCD =
ci
δτi
[∑K
k=1 p¯ii ,kΨi ,k +Zi
] . (21)
Hence, as in case of two outcomes, it holds that 0< β¯i
∣∣
SCD < β¯i < 1, which is why the previ-
ously derived insights stay qualitatively unchanged.
Continuous effort. If effort is continuous, i.e., ei ∈ R+, the first-order condition of the stu-
dent’s effort choice problem, given that she wants to take the exam, is
dui (wi = 1,ei )
dei
=βiδτi
dprobi
(
yi = 1|wi = 1,ei
)
dei
(Ri −Li )−χ′i (ei )= 0. (22)
The optimal effort level e∗i (wi = 1) is a solution of the first-order condition. It exists, is posi-
tive, and unique under the following regularity conditions: (i) the effort cost function χ(ei ) is
45If the soft commitment device causes that p
¯ i
Ri+(1−p
¯ i
)Li ≥ 0, taking the exam is optimal for a student also
if she does not study. The soft commitment device then increases the number of students that take the exam,
but lowers the rate of success. This is not the case in our data.
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increasing, convex, and satisfiesχ′i (0)= 0 and (ii) the success function probi
(
yi = 1|wi = 1,ei
)
is increasing and weakly concave in ei . Note that e∗i (wi = 0) = 0, i.e., the student optimally
invests zero effort if she does not want to take the exam. The student decides to invest study
effort e∗i (wi = 1) and take the exam if and only if46
ui (wi = 1,e∗i (wi = 1))≥ ui (wi = 0,e∗i (wi = 0)). (23)
It is readily shown that the soft commitment device leaves the two effort levels e∗i (wi = 1) and
e∗i (wi = 0) unchanged. Thus, also with continuous effort, only two effort levels are relevant
for the student. We can hence interpret the binary effort specification ei ∈ {0,1} as a reduced
form of the continuous effort specification.
Soft commitment device and effort. In the base model as well as in the extensions we consi-
dered above, the soft commitment device may motivate students to take the exam and thus
to increase their efforts, but students that take the exam invest a constant level of effort. This
implies that the probability of passing an exam is not influenced by the soft commitment
device. To see that the soft commitment device may also change the effort of students con-
ditional on taking the exam, consider the model with continuous effort and suppose that the
soft commitment device raises the student’s reward of passing the exam. Implicitly differen-
tiating the first-order condition (22) reveals that also conditionally on taking the exam does
the soft commitment device increase students’ efforts and thus the probability of passing:
de∗i (wi = 1)
dRi
=−
βiδ
τ
i
dprobi
(
yi=1|wi=1,e∗i (wi=1)
)
dei
βiδ
τ
i
d2probi
(
yi=1|wi=1,e∗i (wi=1)
)
de2i
(Ri −Li )−χ′′i (e∗i (wi = 1))
> 0. (24)
46Note that as in case effort is binary, ei ∈ {0,1}, it is indeed optimal for the student to take the exam if she
has planed to take the exam and invested effort e∗i (wi = 1). Technically, since effort costs are sunk at this
time, whenever ui (wi = 1,e∗i (wi = 1)) ≥ ui (wi = 0,e∗i (wi = 0)) holds true, probi
(
yi = 1|wi = 1,e∗i (wi = 1)
)
Ri +(
1−probi
(
yi = 1|wi = 1,e∗i (wi = 1)
))
Li > 0.
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